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roBert Wilkinson’s Nishida and Western Philosophy joins a growing number of books in English on Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945) 
and the Kyoto School, a list that includes Heisig and Maraldo 1994, Carter 
1997, Heisig 2001, Kopf 2001, Yusa 2002, Wargo 2005, Goto-Jones 2005 and 
2008, and most recently Davis, Schroeder, and Wirth 2011 and Suares 2011. 
A considerable obstacle to furthering the study of Nishida and the Kyoto 
School is the slower pace at which reliable English translations are appear-
ing. Although Nishida is widely recognized not only as the most important 
modern Japanese philosopher, but also as an original thinker on par with the 
pantheon of modern Western philosophers from Descartes to Derrida, to date 
less than a third of his writings are available in English translation. For all its 
commendable qualities as a philosophical introduction to Nishida’s thought, 
Nishida and Western Philosophy is limited by the fact that it is based almost 
entirely on the existing English translations. In addition to the often-remarked 
(and occasionally exaggerated) drawbacks of having to read Nishida through 
the lenses of translators and their sometimes less than literal reiterations of 
his peculiar Japanese prose in the English language, this also means that 
pivotal texts not yet available in English, such as “Basho” 場所 (Place)1 and 
1 Nishida Kitarō zenshū 西田幾多郎全集 (hereafter, NKZ), vol. 4, pp. 208–89. Note that 
a complete translation of “Basho” has recently been published in Krummel and Nagatomo 
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“Watashi to nanji” 私と汝 (I and Thou),2 could not be given their due atten-
tion. Furthermore, and less explicably, Wilkinson draws on only a limited 
range of the available secondary literature. Although he occasionally cites an 
English or French source, not only does he not make reference to any of the 
literature in Japanese or German, many of the secondary sources published in 
English on Nishida’s thought are oddly absent from his bibliography.3 Even 
some primary sources available in English translation are disregarded, leav-
ing some important topics unaddressed. Most notably, Nishida’s controversial 
later writings on political philosophy receive only an oblique mention (p. 
157).4 Wilkinson’s bibliography does not include Dilworth, Viglielmo, and 
Zavala 1998, which provides translations of some of Nishida’s texts on politi-
cal philosophy, nor does it include much of the secondary literature on this 
topic such as Heisig and Maraldo 1994 and Goto-Jones 2005.
I do not mean to imply that a book on Nishida must refer to all the rel-
evant literature that is available (a feat which would no longer be feasible in 
Japanese and which is rapidly becoming less so in English), or that it must 
treat all the major topics in his thought in detail, or even that one must read 
Japanese in order to write a book on Nishida. However, some of the short-
comings of Wilkinson’s interpretation of Nishida can be at least partially 
attributed to the limited sources on which he relies.
The strengths of Wilkinson’s relatively brief and accessible book, on the 
other hand, include its general clarity of presentation and argumentation, 
and its focus—announced in the title—on Nishida’s critical dialogue with 
Western philosophers ancient and modern. This approach is indeed a fruitful 
one, especially for readers acquainted with Western philosophy but not yet 
with Nishida. Wilkinson clarifies many of the issues at stake in Nishida’s 
dialogical confrontations with Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, the 
Neo-Kantians, Fichte, Hegel, James, and Bergson. He also discusses—and 
stresses throughout—the influence of Zen 禅 on Nishida’s thought.
2012, and another abridged translation has appeared in Heisig, Kasulis, and Maraldo 2011. 
German translations of both “Basho” and “Watashi to nanji” are available in Nishida 1999.
2 NKZ, vol. 6, pp. 341–427 
3 Missing secondary sources include Maraldo 2010 (first published in 2005), which con-
tains a good bibliography of works by and on Nishida.
4 All parenthetical page numbers refer to Nishida and Western Philosophy.
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On Zen as the “Starting Point” and “Invariant Core” of Nishida’s 
Philosophy
Wilkinson’s thesis is that “Nishida’s reactions to western thought are only 
intelligible if they are assumed to be expressions of a view of human expe-
rience formed mainly by Zen” (p. 2). In his first chapter he ambitiously 
attempts to sketch “some of the principal points of philosophical doctrine 
involved in Zen,” which are said to form not only “Nishida’s starting point” 
but also “the invariant core of his thought” (pp. 27–28, emphasis added). 
“All the changes and developments in Nishida’s philosophy” are said to be 
“changes only in order to try to articulate better the Zen outlook: that out-
look itself never ceases to be the source of Nishida’s philosophical vision” 
(p. 6). In this one place Wilkinson qualifies this claim as follows: “This is 
not quite to say that Nishida’s is a philosophy ‘based on’ Zen: ‘based on’ 
is too inexact a relational term to capture the complexity of the position” 
(p. 6). But he does not elaborate on this complexity and it is not clear in 
what sense he is not in fact arguing, throughout the book, that Nishida’s 
philosophy is indeed based on—as well as devoted to giving a philosophi-
cal account of—Zen experience. On the complexity of the relation between 
Nishida’s philosophy and Zen, Wilkinson would have done well to con-
sult Ueda Shizuteru’s insightful and influential works on this topic, which 
include an article available in English translation.5
Even if one affirms the close relation between Nishida’s philosophy and 
Zen (which I along with most scholars do), it is questionable whether one 
can simply say that the “two constant features” of Nishida’s thought are “the 
Zen conception of the world which Nishida seeks to articulate” and “the 
western philosophical manner in which he seeks to articulate it” (p. 151). 
The sense in which Nishida may have challenged or modified the methods 
as well as the content of Western philosophy may be debatable, but most 
scholars would refrain from saying that his “Zen outlook” was not signifi-
cantly influenced in any way by the Western philosophies he spent his life 
studying. Many would also argue that Nishida is a highly original cross-
cultural philosopher who does not belong wholly to any single tradition and 
whose thought cannot be simply identified with any pre-established set of 
doctrines. In any case, even if one thinks of Nishida as a philosopher of 
Zen, the problem with beginning a book on his philosophy by laying out 
the “philosophical doctrine involved in Zen” is that it puts the cart before 
5 See Ueda 1991, pp. 171–257; Ueda 2002, pp. 11–105; and Ueda 1993. See also Davis 
2004.
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the horse. Nishida’s struggle no longer makes sense if we think that we can 
“[set] out Nishida’s central beliefs, the ones for which he sought to find a 
conceptual articulation in western thought” (p. 9) beforehand and without 
his help. Although the relation between experience and conceptual thought 
is a philosophically controversial one, it would be more compelling to say 
that the starting point and abiding core of Nishida’s thought was strongly 
influenced by his Zen “experience” than it would be to say that these were 
based on any set of philosophical doctrines or theoretical principles that 
were already formulated prior to his thought.
Nishitani Keiji once showed great displeasure when it was suggested that 
he “provided Zen with a modern fundamental theology.”6 Like Nishida, 
Nishitani thought of himself first and foremost as a philosopher who pursues, 
so far as possible, an unbiased search for truth. Decades earlier, when asked 
by Nishitani about the relation of his own philosophy to Zen, Nishida replied: 
“Certainly, it is fine if you say [that Zen is in the background of my thought], 
but if ordinary uninformed people call my thought ‘Zen’, I would strongly 
object, because they do not understand either Zen or my thought. They sim-
ply bundle together X and Y as the same thing, which is to misunderstand 
both my thought and Zen.”7 While Wilkinson could hardly be dismissed 
as an ordinary uninformed person, Nishida would likely have urged more 
caution in “bundling together” his philosophy and Zen as “the same thing.” 
Moreover, I will return later to a specific problem with reading Nishida 
through the lens of a misconception—or at least an overgeneralization—of 
the attitude toward the individual in Zen and Eastern thought on the whole.
Despite these reservations, I think that chapter 1 of Nishida and Western 
Philosophy does in many respects provide an engaging overview of some of 
the features of the “Zen outlook” as formulated both in traditional texts and 
by modern writers such as Nishida’s lifelong friend Suzuki Daisetsu Teitarō 
鈴木大拙貞太郎 (1870–1966); an outlook that, it is fair to say, deeply informs 
the starting point as well as later stages of Nishida’s thought. These features 
include: “the view that standard human awareness . . . is not the only possi-
ble form of experience”; that another, more fundamental mode of experience 
is possible even though normally hidden from us; that “conceptual ratiocina-
tion does not reveal this deeper stratum of experience but rather conceals it”; 
that “the ego of everyday experience . . . is among the constructs of reason”; 
that there is a “true or real self which is the ultimate reality, the unifying 
6 See Bragt 1992, p. 28.
7 NKZ, vol. 19, p. 225; Yusa 2002, p. xx.
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8 O’Leary 1987, p. xi.
power of the universe”; that “our ordinary conception of time is mistaken”; 
that “the law of non-contradiction is not sacrosanct”; that “dichotomies often 
taken to be ultimate . . . are not so”; and that “the historical, everyday world 
is important, and that other-worldliness is not an appropriate response in 
life” (pp. 28–29). 
On Nishida’s Critical Dialogues with Western Philosophers
In chapter 2, Wilkinson compares and contrasts Nishida’s early philoso-
phy, as found in his maiden work Zen no kenkyū 善の研究 (An Inquiry into 
the Good, 1911), with that of William James, from whom (in part) Nishida 
adopted the term “pure experience.” Wilkinson explains how both James 
and Nishida are concerned to show that subject/object dualism arises from 
a more original level of non-dual experience, but also how their appraisals 
of the latter differ: in contrast to Nishida, there is an “absence of a religious 
impulse” to return to pure experience as a deeper and more unified level 
of reality in James’s radical empiricism (p. 59). While he makes good use 
of James’s writings along with an array of references to Zen no kenkyū, 
Wilkinson could have also drawn on—or least referred the reader onward 
to—some of the previous research published on Nishida’s early philosophy 
of pure experience, such as Feenberg and Arisaka 1990, and Fujita 2004.
Chapter 3 is devoted to Nishida’s second major work, Jikaku ni okeru 
chokkan to hansei 自覚に於ける直感と反省 (Intuition and Reflection in Self-
Awareness, 1917)—or rather to what one of the translators acknowledges as 
the “rather drastically edited” English translation of this text, a translation 
that took “bold liberties which at times amounted to a complete rethinking 
and paraphrasing of the text.”8 Aside from the question of the merits and 
demerits of working solely from this interpretively abridged translation, 
there is the question of whether this work deserves this much attention (one 
of three chapters on the development of Nishida’s philosophy) in the first 
place, since it represents but an early formative stage on the way to Nishida 
tetsugaku proper, which is generally held to begin a decade later with Hata-
raku mono kara miru mono e 働くものから見るものへ (From the Actor to the 
Seer, 1927). Be that as it may, in chapter 3 Wilkinson does manage to shine 
some clarifying rays of light into the thicket of Nishida’s critical dialogues 
with the philosophies of the Neo-Kantians, Fichte, and Bergson during this 
transitional early period of his development. He explains how Nishida takes 
issue with the fundamental tenants of both Kant and the Neo-Kantians, 
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  4 2 ,  2148
namely their basic distinctions (or dualisms) between thought and being and 
between value and fact (p. 92); how Nishida was deeply sympathetic with 
Bergson’s philosophy of intuition and duration but nevertheless found it, 
in the end, to be a one-sided corrective to such dualisms; and how Nishida 
found in Fichte’s Tathandlung the idea of a non-dual origin of act and fact 
that he could agree most closely with, except that for Fichte this act was 
a “precondition for possible experience” while for Nishida it is “our most 
immediate and concrete experience” (pp. 97–98).
Chapter 4 of Nishida and Western Philosophy is entitled “Nishida’s Later 
Philosophy: The Logic of Place and Self-Contradictory Identity.” It should 
really have been divided into two chapters, since it covers both Nishida’s 
middle and later periods, which need to be carefully distinguished.
In the absence of an English translation of “Basho” or other essays 
included in Hataraku mono kara miru mono e, in the first part of chapter 
4 Wilkinson relies mainly on the translations of “Eichi teki sekai” 叡智的
世界 (The Intelligible World) and the “Sōsetsu” 総説 (General Summary) 
from Nishida’s subsequent volume, Ippansha no jikaku teki taikei 一般者の
自覚的体系 (The Self-aware System of Universals, 1930). He explains the 
attempt in these works from Nishida’s middle period to account for all of 
experiential reality in a system of universals or enveloping “places” (basho 
場所). The shallowest “universal of being” is that which contains the objects 
of the natural world as treated by the physical sciences, while the deepest 
levels of the “intelligible universal” include the values of truth, beauty, and 
goodness. Wilkinson is not right, however, to equate the intelligible univer-
sal with the place of absolute nothingness (p. 110); according to Nishida 
the latter envelops the former, which is still delimited by the opposition of 
noesis and noema.9 In any case, as Wilkinson correctly points out: “Under-
lying the whole analysis of the various basho is [Nishida’s] assumption that 
ordinary, everyday experience . . . is both the most concrete and the most 
complex form of experience” (p. 105). In other words, the hierarchy of uni-
versals analyzed in Nishida’s middle-period philosophy reiterates his fun-
damentally anti-reductionist thesis that the world as we directly experience 
it—the “daytime perspective” replete with feeling and volition as well as 
cognition—is the most inclusive and thus the most real dimension of reality, 
the concrete world of non-dual experience from which the scientific world 
of lifeless objects is but an abstraction.
A third of the way into chapter 4 Wilkinson turns his attention to Nishida’s 
later period of thought, writing: “Though Nishida never explicitly recanted 
9 See NKZ, vol. 5, pp. 176–77, 180; Nishida 1958a, pp. 130, 134.
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the complex system of the planes of consciousness or basho . . . he came to 
focus more on what he termed the historical world and its dynamism” (p. 
117). In fact, Nishida considered this to be a major shift in his thought (as do 
most Nishida scholars), a shift that first of all got under way when he began 
to take seriously the question of interpersonal alterity in “Watashi to nanji” 
(1932). It is also clear that Nishida’s attention was turned toward history and 
society in large part by the criticisms he received from his junior colleague 
Tanabe Hajime 田邊元 (1885–1962) and from his student Tosaka Jun 戸坂潤 
(1900–1945), who were influenced for their part by Hegel and Marx.10 In 
his preface to the second volume of Tetsugaku no konpon mondai 哲学の根
本問題 (Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, 1934), Nishida claims to have 
turned from a standpoint that sees the world from the self to a standpoint 
that situates the self in the dialectically self-determining world.11
The Underappreciated Importance of the Individual for Nishida (and Zen)
The significant shift in Nishida’s logic which takes place between his middle 
and later periods calls for more careful attention. In the first part of chapter 
4, Wilkinson refers to Nishida’s “logic of the predicate” in contrast to Aris-
totle’s “logic of the (grammatical) subject,” and in a subsequent section he 
discusses Nishida’s later logic of “absolutely self-contradictory identity.” 
But he does not clearly elucidate the relation between these; specifically, he 
does not explain how a significant change in Nishida’s logic was brought 
about by a shift to a more thoroughly dialectical conception of the relation 
between universal and individual. Let us briefly retrace this development.
For Aristotle the substratum (hypokeimenon) of reality is the individual 
substance (ousia), and accordingly the basis of cognitive judgments is the 
individual treated as the (grammatical) subject that cannot itself become a 
predicate, that is to say, the individual that possesses attributes without being 
wholly determined by or reducible to them. In his middle period Nishida 
turns this around to see reality as a system of predicates that cannot become 
subjects within their own fields of determination. Now, this might seem to 
imply that the existence as well as the definition of the individual could be 
wholly accounted for by means of the self-determination of these universals, 
and then Nishida’s middle-period thought would resemble a kind of Neo-
platonic idealism (compare p. 148). However, as Wilkinson notes, Nishida 
10 See the essays by Tanabe and Tosaka in Fujita 1998. For a detailed account of the devel-
opment of Nishida’s later philosophy in response to Tanabe and Tosaka, see Itabashi 2008. 
For briefer accounts, see chapter 5 of Fujita 2007 and Elberfeld 1999, pp. 119–22.
11 NKZ, vol. 7, p. 203; Nishida 1970, p. 107.
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  4 2 ,  2150
agrees with Aristotle that “[no] list of universals, however extensive, can 
wholly specify an individual” (p. 106). For Nishida, the true individual can 
only be understood as a self-determination of the ultimate universal which 
is beyond any determinate form, namely, the place of absolute nothingness.
This is where Wilkinson’s account needs to be supplemented by follow-
ing Nishida’s concern with the “true individual” (shin no ko 真の個, shin no 
kobutsu 真の個物) into the texts of his later period,12 in which he develops an 
“absolute dialectic” that subsumes both the logic of the subject and the logic 
of the predicate. In the second volume of Tetsugaku no konpon mondai, 
Nishida writes that “in the self-determination of the true dialectical universal 
there must exist the determination of individual-qua-universal and universal-
qua-individual, the determination of the subject-qua-predicate and predicate-
qua-subject. The true hypokeimenon has meaning neither merely in the 
direction of the subject nor in the direction of the predicate. It must be an 
absolute self-identity as the unity of absolute contradictories.” Nishida goes 
on to acknowledge here that what he “once called the self-determination of 
the self-aware universal” had referred to only the predicative, noetic side of 
this bilaterally dialectical relation.13 
In his later thought, Nishida thus becomes increasingly concerned with 
the status and role of the individual, which he repeatedly stresses is not 
simply determined by universals but also “counter-determines” (gyaku gen-
tei suru 逆限定する) them.14 As the later Nishida is fond of saying, the true 
individual is a “creative element of a creative world.”15
These indications of the importance of the individual for the later Nishida 
take us back to Wilkinson’s first chapter and forward to his concluding 
reflections, and specifically to his problematic characterization of Zen and 
Eastern thought on the whole as being anti-individual. In his initial presen-
tation of the philosophical principles of Zen, Wilkinson defines “non-dual” 
as “wholly undifferentiated,” which he says implies that all distinctions 
12 For other treatments of the importance of the individual in Nishida’s later thought, see 
Cestari 2008 and Laurent 2011.
13 NKZ, vol. 7, p. 238; Nishida 1970, p. 124. See also NKZ, vol. 11, pp. 388–91, 416; 
Nishida 1986, pp. 13–15; Nishida 1987, p. 84.
14 See NKZ, vol. 7, pp. 305ff.; Nishida 1970, pp. 163ff.; NKZ, vol. 8, pp. 313–14.
15 NKZ, vol. 8, pp. 314, 339; NKZ, vol. 10, p. 307. Wilkinson comes closest to attending 
to the importance of the individual for the later Nishida when he considers Nishida’s adop-
tion and adaptation of Leibniz’s notion of “monads” that mirror the world from their unique 
perspectives. Wilkinson notes that the difference is that “Nishida’s selves are fully interac-
tive with the world, and indeed contribute to its constant self-formation, whereas a Leibniz-
ian monad is windowless—a non-interactive substance” (p. 133).
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are ultimately “illusory” (p. 8). Yet non-duality in Zen does not ultimately 
refer to a monistic One that denies the reality of the differentiated Many, 
but rather to a dynamically integrated condition of “not one and not two” 
(fuichi funi 不一不二), that is, to seeing the Many in the One and the One 
in the Many (issokuta, tasokuitsu 一即多・多即一). As Wilkinson himself 
indicates in places, for Zen and for Nishida the non-duality of reality is 
not a matter of oneness without manyness, but rather a matter of a “unity 
of opposites” for which Nishida sought a logical principle with his idea of 
“absolutely contradictory self-identity” (see pp. 117, 125–26, 148–49).
Taking off from Nishida’s own schematic distinction between a Western 
proclivity toward a metaphysics of being and form and an Eastern procliv-
ity toward a metaphysics of nothingness and formlessness, Wilkinson ends 
up asserting that a cooperative meeting of East and West is impossible 
on account of their incommensurable attitudes toward the individual. In 
sharp contrast to the “depth of the belief in the reality (and indeed value) 
of individuals in western culture,” Wilkinson claims that “Nirvana (like its 
close logical analogues, moksha in Hinduism, and the state of being a sage 
[or shengren 聖人] in Daoism) is the condition in which anything the West 
would call being an individual ceases. . . . Thus in these traditions the state 
of being an individual is . . . a condition to be overcome” (p. 158). While 
Nishida’s comparative philosophy of cultures remains worthy of careful 
and critical consideration, Wilkinson’s characterization of Eastern meta-
physics—including Nishida’s philosophy—as anti-individual will strike 
many readers as a misleading overgeneralization if not an anachronisti-
cally dichotomizing Orientalism. At the very least, it is a claim in need of 
more careful explanation and qualification. There are many Eastern as well 
as many Western schools of thought about the individual. We need to also 
attend to important distinctions made within many of these schools between 
“ego” and “true self,” between jīva and ātman, between ga 我 and jiko 自己, 
and so on. It could certainly be argued that Eastern traditions have more 
clearly and consistently rejected atomistic and substantial conceptions of 
the individual, but this does not by any means necessarily entail a rejection 
of the individual and individuality altogether. The annals of the Zen tradi-
tion, after all, are filled with uniquely expressive personalities!
Not only does the aim of a total “cessation of the individual” not apply to 
Nishida’s thought, which in fact, as we have seen, increasingly stressed the 
reality and value of the individual, this characterization of the goal of Bud-
dhism, Hinduism, and Daoism is disputable, even as a general tendency: 
The ontological reality of individual selves is maintained in many forms of 
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Hinduism (including Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and Dvaita Vedānta); the Dao-
ist sage generally remains an identifiable individual even as he or she lives 
in harmony with the dao 道; and Mahayana Buddhism explicitly renounces 
the “cessation nirvana” of the so-called Hinayana schools. Bodhisattvas 
seek “non-abiding nirvana” as they vow to remain individuals helping other 
individuals (whose life streams are interdependent yet not indistinguish-
able), and Nāgārjuna and others go even further to proclaim the non-duality 
of nirvana and samsara. In general, the reaffirmation of the world of mun-
dane reality in Mahayana Buddhism is also a reaffirmation of individual 
differences. In Zen, equality that merely annihilates individual differences 
is known as “bad equality” (aku byōdō 悪平等), and attachment to such a 
state of non-individuation is known as “emptiness sickness” (kūbyō 空病). 
Wilkinson himself notes that “nothingness” or mu 無 is not only “absolutely 
non-dual, in other words, undifferentiated in every way” (p. 10), for “it 
would be better regarded as a verb denoting the pure activity of emptying. 
Mu empties everything, including itself, incessantly”; in other words, emp-
tiness (of an atomistic substantializing of individual distinctions) empties 
itself out into fullness (of dynamically interrelated individual distinctions). 
Hence, for Zen “the One and the Many are in a certain sense identical; the 
samsara and nirvana are one and the same” (p. 13).
Nishida did not disregard the differences among the Many individuals 
by submerging them back into a universal One. In fact, insofar as a univer-
sal has determinate content, that is, insofar as it is a “universal of being,” 
Nishida insists that “between true individuals . . . there cannot be a so-
called universal which includes them.” “Moreover,” he goes on to say, “dia-
lectical determination must be understood in terms of individuals mutually 
determining one another in the sense of a self-identity of absolute contra-
dictories.”16 Only the ultimate “universal of nothingness”—which acts as 
the place or the medium of this dialectical interaction between individu-
als—can contain true individuals, and it can do this only by means of its 
own self-negation: “When the universal truly negates itself it must become 
a world of individuals.”17 This kenotic self-negation of the absolute which 
enables the existence of the relative, in other words, the self-emptying of 
the One into the Many, is the heart of Nishida’s understanding of God or 
ultimate reality as absolute nothingness.18 
16 NKZ, vol. 7, p. 312; Nishida 1970, p. 167, translation modified. See also NKZ, vol. 6, p. 
381 and Davis 2011.
17 NKZ, vol. 7, p. 313; Nishida 1970, p. 167. See Wilkinson’s p. 148.
18 See NKZ, vol. 11, pp. 397ff.
D AV I S :  N O T H I N G N E S S  A N D  T H E  I N D I V I D U A L 153
Choosing East or West: A Problematic Conclusion
Wilkinson concludes his book by saying that we have to “make a choice” 
between Nishida’s fundamentally Eastern philosophy of Zen and Western 
philosophy. Wilkinson claims that we are presented with a Kierkegaardian 
either/or decision to make between Eastern and Western ways of thinking 
about reality (pp. 159–61). While there are indeed profound differences 
between Nishida’s philosophy and many of the main streams of the West-
ern philosophical tradition, and while Nishida’s philosophy is certainly 
deeply connected with certain Eastern traditions of thought and practice 
(especially Zen), there are three basic problems with Wilkinson’s conclu-
sion, which identifies Nishida with the East and which posits an either/or 
choice between East and West. First of all, it exaggerates the agreement on 
fundamental principles both among Western philosophers (the Aristotelian 
conception of individual substances, for example, is hardly accepted by all 
Western philosophers from Heraclitus to Heidegger) and among Eastern 
schools of thought (there are great debates on a number of fundamental 
issues both within and between schools of Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, 
and Confucianism).
Secondly, Nishida sought a new encompassing logic, not simply an alter-
native logic. It is true that he sometimes referred to this more encompass-
ing logic as the further development of an “Eastern logic,” but most often 
he insisted that philosophy, logic, and science must be universal and do 
not belong to Japan or any other nation or region of the globe. In any case, 
Nishida’s new logic would include, rather than merely stand opposed to, the 
“object logic” that has predominated in the West.19 “I am not saying that 
logic is of two kinds, Western logic and Eastern logic. Logic must be one. 
It is just that, as the form of the self-formation of the historical world, it 
has taken different directions in the course of its development.”20 Nishida 
sought the underlying root of this logic of the historical world, the root from 
which stemmed both Eastern and Western ways of thinking. As Ueda notes, 
Nishida’s philosophical path was ultimately aimed, not simply at siding 
with the East in opposition to the West, but at “digging down in between 
East and West.”21
Thirdly, the quasi-existentialist idea of “choosing” the philosophical prin-
ciples in terms of which one is inclined to think about reality would indeed 
19 See NKZ, vol. 10, pp. 474–75; NKZ, vol. 11, p. 416; Nishida 1987, p. 84.
20 NKZ, vol. 12, p. 289; Nishida 1958b, p. 356, translation modified.
21 Ueda 2011, p. 31.
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be a form of individualistic voluntarism that is foreign to Nishida, who 
always sought universal truth by means of unbiased philosophical reason in 
conjunction with the religious practice of emptying oneself of egoistic par-
tiality. To end by saying that as individuals we can and must simply “choose” 
which philosophy best accords with our status quo manner of experienc-
ing the world would be, for Nishida, as for most philosophers in the West 
as well as in the East, to abandon the core commitment of the philosophi-
cal endeavor. Unlike theology, philosophy is not based on a given set of 
doctrines. And unlike the sciences, which normally operate on the basis of 
their own presuppositions and hypotheses, “philosophy,” writes Nishida, 
“seeks to dig down further beneath these presuppositions and return to their 
origin, so as to bring them under the sway of what is immediately given.”22 
Nishida goes on to say that “what is immediate, truly concrete, and origi-
nary, is in fact the content of religion. At this point, philosophy and reli-
gion converge. But philosophy seeks to illuminate this conceptually, while 
religion experiences it, and seeks to live it directly.”23 Although Nishida 
calls this most fundamental level of experience “religious,” this means for 
him nothing otherworldly or “mystical” but rather “the factual basis of our 
everyday life” from which “science too originates.”24 For Nishida, philoso-
phy is a discipline which takes us back toward, as well as reflects upon, 
this fundamental level of experience. In other words, philosophical think-
ing involves an ego-negating practice that opens up a deeper level of self-
awareness.25 Philosophy is not just a matter of “working out rigorously 
the consequences of one’s foundational beliefs [which are] dependent on 
equally foundational experience” (p. 159); it is also a practice of examin-
ing and in the process enriching and potentially altering one’s foundational 
experiences, a practice of putting in question and often revising one’s fun-
damental beliefs. Philosophy does not just reflect on and express, but also 
has the potential to deepen and transform our lives. It is not a matter of 
choice but rather a love of wisdom that inspires an ethos of “going to the 
truth of things” (mono no shinjitsu ni yuku 物の真実に行く), an ethos that 
Nishida thought could connect, rather than divide, East and West.26
22 NKZ, vol. 15, p. 47.
23 Ibid.
24 NKZ, vol. 10, pp. 119–20.
25 See NKZ, vol. 11, pp. 173–74.
26 See NKZ, vol. 12, pp. 280, 346.
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